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PLEADING STANDARDS SHOULD NOT CHANGE 
AFTER BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY 
Keith Bradley∗ 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly was an antitrust case.  This description would 
have seemed obvious to the parties, their counsel, and all the courts consid-
ering the case, including the Supreme Court that ultimately decided it this 
May.  Alas, however, Justice Stevens, in dissent, portrayed Twombly as a 
sweeping revision of the standards for civil pleadings and dismissals in 
general.1  Six months later, his view seems to have prevailed,2 and language 
like the following is now common:  “[Twombly] clarified the pleading stan-
dards concerning what is necessary to defeat a 12(b)(6) motion. . . . How-
ever, Twombly does not appear to have changed the substantive antitrust 
law . . . .”3  This statement has it backwards. 
This Colloquy Post argues that Twombly changed antitrust law by 
modifying the elements of an antitrust conspiracy claim, but did not rework 
pleading rules across the board.  Although the Court briefly discussed 
Conley v. Gibson, its language differed only superficially from the existing 
law of civil procedure.  Meanwhile, the concept of “plausibility,” which at-
torneys and courts have begun to apply to all pleadings,4 is actually antitrust 
jargon.  The Court used “plausibility” in its antitrust context, to resolve an 
existing problem in antitrust law, and it is a misreading of Twombly to ex-
tend “plausibility” beyond that context. 
 ∗  The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from Michael C. Dorf, Robert L. Trenchard, 
Matthew L. Dunne, Judge Janice Rogers Brown, Judge Raymond Clevenger, and Judge Gerard E. 
Lynch.  The author is a 2007 graduate of the Columbia Law School who is currently clerking for Judge 
Janice Rogers Brown on the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The opinions expressed in this essay 
are solely his, developed through his general study of antitrust law, and do not reflect the opinion of the 
court. 
1  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974–89 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (link). 
2  See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 121 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (link); Michael 
C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts—Again, FINDLAW, Aug. 13, 
2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html (link); Ted Frank, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 
POINTOFLAW.COM, May 21, 2007, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/003906.php (link). 
3  In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 244 F.R.D. 70, 73 n.5 (D. Me. 2007); 
see also Iqbal v. Hasty, No. 05-5768, slip op. at 28 (2d Cir., June 14, 2007) (interpreting Twombly as 
requiring “a flexible ‘plausibility standard’” in pleading).  Not all courts have followed the trend, how-
ever.  E.g., McZeal v. Sprint NexTel Corp., No. 06-1548, slip op. at 5 n.4 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 14, 2007) (de-
termining Twombly’s discussion of Conley v. Gibson made no change to pleading standards). 
4  See Dodson, supra note 2. 
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Many commentators have focused on the Court’s apparent revision of 
Conley v. Gibson’s venerable standard that a case should survive unless 
there could be “no set of facts” under which the plaintiff might recover.5  
However, all Twombly actually said was that these four words have a limit, 
since a plaintiff must at least provide facts that relate to some theory on 
which he could recover, thereby providing the defendant the requisite “fair 
notice” of the “grounds on which the claim rests.”6  This has always been 
the case, as Form 9, the sample complaint in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, illustrates.7  In Form 9, the complaint does not just allege negli-
gence but also states the scene of the negligence and the harm it caused.  As 
another example, a complaint that simply said, “Defendants are thieves,” 
would never have sufficed.  Under any interpretation of Rule 8(a),8 a suc-
cessful complaint would at least have to say what the defendants stole and 
from whom.  Without those facts, the complaint would not provide any ba-
sis on which the defendants could be liable for any particular amount to any 
particular plaintiff.  As Twombly put it, a complaint must “give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the claim is.”9   
In antitrust, a complaint simply alleging that the defendants agreed not 
to enter each others’ territories would be much like the simple “thief” label.  
Thus, it is not enough just to recite the words “entered into a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy.”10  For many kinds of Section One case, such as 
price-fixing, the presence or absence of agreement is the entire dispute.11  
The illegal conduct is the agreement itself; the underlying activities would 
usually be perfectly legal, indeed healthy and productive, without agree-
ment.12  If agreement is the entire charge, a complaint must at least say who 
agreed and when.  Lacking this information, the Twombly complaint was 
forced to rely only on circumstantial allegations.13 
The central question in Twombly was whether these circumstantial al-
legations were sufficient to support an antitrust conspiracy claim, and Jus-
tice Stevens was mistaken to assume that “there [was] no dispute about the 
 
5  127 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 
6  127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3 (majority op.). 
7  See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9. 
8  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
9  127 S. Ct. at 1964. 
10  The Twombly dissent emphasizes that the complaint did contain such an allegation, and dismisses 
the need for allegations about who conspired and when as “academic.”  127 S. Ct. at 1985 n.9 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
11  See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶ 1402 (2003) (noting that the Sherman Act is con-
cerned with activity like price fixing only when it results from an agreement).  Of course, most conduct, 
like ordinary sales, is legal even in the presence of agreement.  Id. at ¶ 1400b. 
12  See, e.g., Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( “If the defendants acted inde-
pendently, their conduct was perfectly lawful.”). 
13  Id. at 1971 n.10 (majority op.) (“[T]he pleadings mentioned no specific time, place, or person in-
volved in the alleged conspiracies . . . contrast[ing] sharply with . . . Form 9 . . . .”). 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/31/ 118
102:117  (2007) Pleading Standards Should Not Change 
substantive law.”14  To the contrary, lower courts have disputed for two 
decades exactly what circumstantial evidence a plaintiff must show to win 
an antitrust conspiracy case.  Thus, Twombly involved an important anti-
trust question that needed an answer.  In resolving the debate, the Twombly 
Court held, as a matter of antitrust law, that the plaintiffs had alleged the 
wrong facts, not insufficient facts.  Instead of the parallel conduct and plus 
factors alleged, the Court held that the plaintiffs should have pled facts 
showing a plausible conspiracy.   
To explain the import of plausibility requires a brief review of antitrust 
history.  The question of what circumstantial evidence suffices to show an 
agreement has always been difficult, because conduct that might otherwise 
be efficient market activity can result in heavy penalties if a court finds that 
defendants agreed on the conduct.15  Of course, it must be possible to show 
an antitrust conspiracy with circumstantial evidence, because direct evi-
dence is rarely available.  The first step is to show that defendants were all 
acting in parallel, in what appeared to be a concerted manner.  Second, par-
allel conduct must be supported by one or more “plus factors,” such as a 
highly concentrated market, communication among the defendants, or ac-
tions contrary to their interests.16  In reality, even these factors are ambigu-
ous evidence of agreement.  For example, in a highly concentrated market it 
is easier to collude; but the concentration makes it more likely that the few 
market participants would follow each others’ prices even without an 
agreement. 
The last time the Supreme Court considered how to prove an antitrust 
conspiracy with circumstantial evidence it heightened the confusion.  In 
Matsushita, the Court observed that when a supposed conspiracy is implau-
sible, a plaintiff needs to provide more evidence to prove it.17  Conversely, 
for a plaintiff to prevail based on inferences drawn from plus factors, the 
conspiracy itself needs to be somewhat plausible.18  The problem is that 
plausibility, in the Court’s eyes, rests mostly on whether the alleged scheme 
would have been in the defendants’ interests.  For example, in Matsushita 
the Court concluded that the scheme would actually have lost the defen-
dants money.  On the other hand, actions against the defendants’ interests 
are traditionally the most powerful plus factor tending to support the infer-
ence of agreement.  Thus, plausibility conflicted with the existing analytical 
scheme for circumstantial evidence in Section One cases. 
In the two decades since Matsushita, the lower courts have developed a 
variety of ways to resolve this tension.  Some have held that a plaintiff can 
 
14  Id. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
15  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11 at ¶ 1405a (discussing how the Sherman Act is con-
cerned with activity like price fixing only when it results from an agreement). 
16  Id. at ¶ 1434a. 
17  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (link). 
18  See id. at 595. 
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avoid the issue of plausibility by presenting any direct evidence of an 
agreement, even if the case largely relies on inferences.19  The Seventh Cir-
cuit responded by jettisoning “plus factors” in favor of a new, holistic ap-
proach, and by restricting Matsushita’s plausibility threshold to cases in 
which the alleged conspiracy was actually implausible.20   
Other courts recognize a distinction between legitimate business inter-
ests and rational economic motives.21  Actions against legitimate interests 
are presumably in favor of illegitimate interests—like hobbling free compe-
tition—and therefore support an inference of conspiracy.  By contrast, even 
colluders pursue their rational economic motives, legitimate or not; actions 
against these would be implausible.  To distinguish these concepts, some 
circuits use burden-shifting:  once a plaintiff shows parallel conduct with 
plus factors, the defendants must justify their conduct; the plaintiff can then 
show the justifications were false or illegitimate.22  The First Circuit, by 
contrast, requires that plaintiffs show the conspiracy was in defendants’ ra-
tional economic interests as part of the prima facie case.23  It is not enough 
for plaintiffs to allege a conspiracy and support it with allegations that the 
defendants acted contrary to their interests if it was not also clear why the 
defendants would conspire.24 
Twombly was the first Supreme Court case on antitrust conspiracy 
since Matsushita, and a careful reading of the opinion reveals that the Court 
intended to prune the thicket of standards that had arisen.  The Court clari-
fied the prima facie Section One case, not the general standard for plead-
ings.  It addressed “the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must 
plead . . . under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”25  In reciting the general pleading 
standards, the Court acknowledged that a plaintiff need only allege enough 
to win if all his allegations were true.  The concept of plausibility appeared 
only when the Court “appl[ied] these general standards to a § 1 claim.”26  
 
19  See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he strictures 
of Matsushita do not apply when a plaintiff provides direct evidence.”) (internal citation omitted); In re 
Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the Matsushita test applies “whenever a 
plaintiff rests its case entirely on circumstantial evidence”). 
20  In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655–62 (7th Cir. 2002). 
21  AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) (joining a conspiracy would be 
against “rational economic motive[s],” and on the other hand the actual conduct was consistent with “le-
gitimate, independent business interests”). 
22  Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(holding plaintiff had the burden “to rebut the producers’s [sic] independent business justification”); In 
re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that once plaintiffs have sup-
plemented with plus factors, “a rebuttable presumption of conspiracy arises”). 
23  DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56–57 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding 
plaintiff failed to show why the defendants would have entered the conspiracy). 
24  Id. 
25  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (emphasis added). 
26  Id. at 1965. 
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The alleged facts must “render a § 1 conspiracy plausible.”27  By contrast, 
“nothing contained in the [Twombly] complaint invest[ed] either the action 
or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy.”28 
As these quotations suggest, Twombly changes the standard for meas-
uring a plaintiff’s circumstantial proof of an antitrust conspiracy.  Whereas 
Matsushita demanded stronger evidence if a conspiracy was not plausible, 
Twombly assumes a conspiracy is not plausible and forces a plaintiff to 
show otherwise.  By focusing on whether a conspiracy is plausible, 
Twombly jettisons the existing plus factors doctrine.   
Indeed, the plaintiffs had actually structured their complaint in terms of 
the plus factors, but the Court rejected those allegations as irrelevant.29  The 
complaint pointed out that the market was highly concentrated30 and men-
tioned communications among the defendants.31  Finally, it clearly alleged 
that the defendants had acted against their legitimate interests, in that each 
of them could have had “an especially attractive business opportunity,” with 
a “substantial competitive advantage[],” to consolidate their splintered geo-
graphic territories.32  Addressing these allegations, the Court did not even 
mention the term “plus factors.”  It did discuss the allegations, but found 
them “not suggestive of conspiracy.”33  For example, forgoing the attractive 
business opportunity was not really action against legitimate interests, be-
cause the defendants were simply protecting their existing turf.34  
Instead, the Court analyzed the complaint in terms of the plausibility of 
the alleged conspiracy.  It found the most important allegation to be the 
claim that “collusion was necessary” to avoid letting new entrants become 
models of successful competition.35  Such an allegation focuses on the ac-
tual interests that drove the defendants to conspire, rather than on their pre-
sumed interests in the absence of a conspiracy.  Nevertheless, the Court 
ultimately found this allegation insufficient, because “there was just no 
need” for a conspiracy.36  With this argument, the Court focused on 
 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 1971. 
29  Id. at 1971–72 n.12 (holding communications within trade associations are not evidence of con-
spiracy); id. at 1972 (defendants had a legitimate business interest in protecting their existing monopo-
lies). 
30  Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶ 48, Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (No. 02 CIV 10220) (holding “the four defendants . . . account for as much as ninety percent . . . 
of the market[]”). 
31  Id. at ¶ 46 (“The RBOCs do indeed communicate amongst themselves . . . .”). 
32  Id. at ¶ 40–41.  A map attached to the complaint illustrated that the defendants’ territories, in 
which each had its monopoly, interpenetrated each other to a remarkable degree.  For example, Verizon, 
the phone company in the Northeast, also served small patches of Texas, California, Washington, and 
Florida.  See Joint Appendix exhibits A & B, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (No. 05-1126). 
33  Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972. 
34  Id. at 1972. 
35  Id. at 1971. 
36  Id. 
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whether, given the allegations of the defendants’ real economic situation, it 
was plausible that they would have conspired.  This sense of plausibility is 
quite different from what subsequent commentators have inferred, and it 
has meaning only for antitrust cases.  It does not imply that a court should 
assess whether it is likely, with whatever degree of probability, that the 
plaintiff will win.  “Plausibility” thus interpreted would not be consistent 
with the principle that a court should assume that all the allegations are true.  
After all, Twombly reaffirmed that principle, and the Court emphasized the 
point two weeks later in Erickson v. Pardus.37  There, the Court allowed a 
complaint based only on scant allegations that the defendant had endan-
gered the plaintiff’s life by withholding needed medicine.38  Rather than 
probability, “plausibility” means that a Section One plaintiff must allege, 
and the court should examine, facts about the defendants’ rational motives 
in their actual circumstances.  It would be senseless to demand “plausibil-
ity,” in this sense, in other kinds of cases.  It would not matter, for example, 
whether a defamation defendant had a rational economic motive to malign a 
plaintiff, or if a § 1983 defendant had a rational motive to infringe a plain-
tiff’s civil rights.  “Plausibility,” as the Twombly Court used the term, is a 
concept specific to antitrust conspiracies. 
In sum, we must read Twombly in the context of antitrust law.  In anti-
trust, a “naked allegation of conspiracy” is not enough to survive dismissal 
any more than the bare allegation that “defendant is a thief” would be.  Ask-
ing a plaintiff to say who conspired and when, either directly or indirectly, 
is not a special pleading requirement.  To the contrary, it is the same as the 
standard exemplified by Form 9.  The Twombly complaint did not make 
such allegations directly but relied on suspicious circumstances.  Naturally, 
not every bit of circumstantial evidence would help such a case; for exam-
ple, the circumstance that the defendants were all telephone companies 
would be irrelevant to the charge of conspiracy.  In Twombly, the Supreme 
Court decided that plus factors like action against interests are similarly ir-
relevant, and it demanded instead that plaintiffs focus on showing why de-
fendants would be motivated to conspire.  This is an important change in 
antitrust law, but it does not provide a rule for other kinds of cases.  “Plau-
sibility” is an element of a certain kind of antitrust conspiracy claim, not a 
standard for pleadings in general. 
 
37  Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2198 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 
1959) (link). 
38  Id. 
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